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Dauscher: Discretionary Injustice

DISCRETIONARY INJUSTICE: LIMITING DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS UPON REMOVAL AFTER REENTRY

Brendan Dauscher*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Immigration in the United States is cyclical by nature.
Attitudes towards immigrating citizens have oscillated throughout
our nation’s history, shifting from periods of acceptance and embrace
to periods of exclusion and neglect. 1 Amidst the humanitarian crisis
at the border, there also lies a constitutional one. Specifically, there
is great deference given to immigration judges and executive actors
in cases involving removal after re-entry.2 Immigration judges are
*Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2022; University
of Pittsburgh, B.S. in Business Adminisration, 2014. Thank you to my faculty
advisor, Professor Jeffrey Morris, for his guidance and honest critique. Thank you
to the Law Review’s faculty advisor, Professor Rena Seplowitz for her support and
assistance throughout the writing and editing process. Next, thank you to the entire
staff and editorial board of the Touro Law Review for being supportive and diligent
throughout the drafting process. Additionally, I want to give special thanks to
Michael Petridis for his tireless efforts and thoughtful feedback throughout the
editing process. This note was inspired by the ongoing immigration crisis and the
humanitarian concerns associated with it. This issue highlights the need for
expansive due process rights for all people, regardless of citizenship. Finally, I
would like to thank my friends and family, especially my mother and father, for
their love and support with every goal I set out to achieve. This would not have
been possible without them.
1
History.com Authors, U.S. Immigration Timeline, HISTORY.COM, (May 14, 2019),
https://www.history.com/topics/immigration/immigration-united-states-timeline.
2
See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 611 (2006) (“Discretion permits adjudicators to engage in individualized
decision making, considering the full complexity of an applicant's situation rather
than reducing it to a checklist of standard factors. It allows the agency to temper the
rigidity of statutory rules with attention to exceptional circumstances. . . The
decision on discretionary relief in a removal proceeding is thus a choice of the
appropriate disposition of the case by the adjudicating official. The immigration
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administrative officials who are tasked with adjudicating removal
hearings. The power of immigration judges is vested legislatively
through Congress.3 These judges are housed in administrative courts
and determine if immigrants will be removed, allowed to remain in
the United States, or granted discretionary relief from deportation. 4
The narrow issue of whether an immigrant has the
constitutional right to be informed of the opportunity to seek
discretionary relief typically arises during a removal proceeding after
unauthorized re-entry into the United States. The case at issue,
United States v. Estrada,5 is one involving a Mexican citizen, Emilio
Estrada.6 Mr. Estrada was a green-card holder but not a citizen of the
United States.7 In 2009, Mr. Estrada was indicted for committing an
aggravated felony.8 He was charged with possession of a firearm by
an unlawful user of methamphetamine and was subsequently
deported.9 After his deportation, he was found in the United States in
2015.10 Estrada was charged with illegal re-entry after removal and
scheduled for a hearing before an immigration judge. 11
During his deportation hearing, the immigration judge did not
inform him or his counsel of his opportunity to seek discretionary
relief.12 Discretionary relief offers immigrants a chance to avoid
deportation proceedings and remain in the United States if they can
show the possibility of a favorable outcome at their hearing. 13
Estrada moved to dismiss the indictment via a collateral attack on the
underlying deportation order, arguing that the immigration judge
violated his due process rights by “failing to advise him of the
possibility of discretionary relief from removal under § 212(h) of the

judge can choose milder or more rigid sanctions, or may choose to impose no
sanction at all, restoring a legally deportable permanent resident to good standing.”)
3
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (delegating to immigration judges the power to adjudicate
inadmissibility or deportability in removal proceedings).
4
Catherine Kim, Article: The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1, 3
(2018).
5
876 F.3d 885 (6th Cir. 2017)
6
Id. at 886.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
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Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).”14 The motion was
subsequently denied, and Estrada appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals for review. 15 The Sixth Circuit, in a de novo review,
analyzed the attack on his deportation order.16 The Sixth Circuit
thoroughly analyzed 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) and specifically the third
element, which was the center of Estrada’s appeal. 17 The appellate
court focused exclusively on the fundamental fairness element of the
appeal.18 Ultimately, after reviewing other sister circuits’ decisions
on this issue, the Sixth Circuit held that counsel’s failure to inform
the defendant of his right to assert discretionary relief from
deportation, in underlying removal proceedings, did not violate Mr.
Estrada’s due process rights.19 The Supreme Court denied certiorari
in the instant case; however, a genuine constitutional issue still
exists.20
Today, the circuits remain split on the issue of whether an
immigrant must be informed of the availability of discretionary relief
in a deportation hearing. 21 While the Sixth Circuit joined the
majority of circuits that have decided this issue, its decision
reinvigorated the debate of whether a national policy needs to be
adopted. The minority of the circuits find that an immigrant has a
right to be informed of discretionary relief from deportation and the
failure to inform amounts to fundamental unfairness under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(d)(3).22 This Note will argue for the national implementation
and adoption of the Second Circuit’s reasonable probability standard
through a Supreme Court ruling on the issue to settle the current
circuit split or pointed legislative action to provide further guidance
in deportation hearings regarding discretionary relief. Preferably, the
former would best settle this Circuit split, however, it would require a
ripe case and controversy for the court to grant certiorari.
Undocumented immigrants have a protected liberty interest to
be informed of their eligibility for discretionary relief from
14

Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)).
Id.
16
Id.at 887.
17
Id. (“[T]he entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.”).
18
Id.
19
Id. at 888-889.
20
United States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885, 886 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.
Ct. 2623 (2018).
21
See id. at 888 (explaining the circuit split).
22
Id.
15
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deportation.23 Suppression of the opportunity to be informed of such
relief gives rise to a due process violation regardless of the regardless
of the outcome of the hearing. 24 Currently, the circuit courts disagree
about an immigrant’s right to be informed of discretionary relief. 25
The majority of the circuits follow the statute in a textualist form. 26
However, the minority of the circuits consider other factors when
deciding the issue of discretionary relief.27 The majority of the cases
dealing with this issue involve criminal defendants who were
deported because of their criminal conviction and found in the United
States after re-entry. This Note evaluates the constitutionality of
informing immigrants of their opportunity to seek discretionary
relief.28
Section II of this Note will discuss the relevant constitutional
provisions and the legislative history of the broad application of these
principles to undocumented immigrants by immigration judges. The
goal of broad application of Constitutional principles is to ensure
fairness in largely discretionary hearings conducted by one sole
arbiter, the immigration judge, as an agent of the executive branch.
Section III will discuss the relevant congressional action taken and §§
1182, 1229, 1326 of the United States Code in detail. Section IV will
examine the cases heard before United States Supreme Court that
deal with the application of due process rights for noncitizens and
illustrate the importance of maintaining defendants’ rights during
their deportation hearings. Section V will discuss important cases
that reflect the Circuit split. Section VI will set forth arguments that
illustrate the dichotomous nature of the Circuit Split. Part A will
address the stance that failure to consider an immigrant for
discretionary relief is not fundamentally unfair. Part B will argue that
failure to consider an immigrant for discretionary relief is
23

Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 98 (1903); see United States v. UbaldoFigueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1050 (9th Cir. 2003).
24
Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d at 1047-48.
25
Id.; see also United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004); United States
v. Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2002).
26
“Textualism is a legal philosophy that laws and legal documents should be
interpreted by considering only the words used in the law or document as they are
commonly understood.” Textualism, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/textualism (last visited Mar. 27, 2021).
27
United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 2003); see
also United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004).
28
United States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885, 886 (6th Cir. 2017).
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fundamentally unfair. Part C will argue that under the Mathews Test,
the failure to consider an immigrant for discretionary relief violates
the immigrants’ liberty interest and therefore is not in line with the
requirements of procedural due process protections. Furthermore,
this section will highlight the paramount importance of the individual
liberty interest and need for unsuppressed due process protections in
contrast with the governments’ desire of financial and ministerial
efficiency. Finally, Section VII will examine the importance of
expansive due process rights for non-citizens. It will also discuss the
three-pronged test set forth in § 1326 (d) 29 and its inherent
vagueness. It will conclude that the United States should adopt a
national standard implementing the reasonable probability standard
set forth in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
decision in United States v. Copeland 30 and implement the reasonable
probability standard established in that case. 31
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The Founding Fathers understood that knowledge and
education were essential to preserve peace and order among members
of our society.32 As Thomas Jefferson once said, “I know of no safe
depositor of the ultimate powers of society but the people themselves;
and if we think them not enlightened . . . the remedy is not to take it
from them, but to inform their discretion by education.”33 Most
founders recognized that the Constitution was in fact incomplete and
that the Bill of Rights was necessary to preserve individual liberties.34
29

8 U.S.C. § 1326 (d).
376 F.3d 61, 74 (2d Cir. 2004).
31
The Copeland standard states that if the act of informing an immigrant of the
opportunity for discretionary relief would have given a reasonable probability of
success then its advisement is required under § 1326 (d). Additionally, this section
will address two more issues. First, the discretion provided to immigration judges
in § 1326(d) cases. Second, the need to adopt a clear standard that ensures
fundamental fairness to all defendants in removal after re-entry proceedings,
regardless of where the hearing is located.
32
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (1820) (speaking
generally about the utmost importance of the respect for the three independent
branches of government to avoid tyranny and emphasizing that education and
awareness are the ultimate dispositors of constitutional wrongs in society).
33
Id.
34
See generally James Madison, Cong. Register, I, 423-37 “I should advocate
greater dispatch in the business of amendments . . . I think we should obtain the
30
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Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

The entire Bill of Rights, including the Fifth Amendment,
applies directly to the federal government. Arguably, the most
impactful liberties are those found in the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment which states that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 35 The
drafters of the Constitution were meticulous in their efforts and
deliberate in their word choice. 36 The subsequent generations of
legislators also had great attention for detail. 37 Of the nearly 7,600
words used in the U.S. Constitution and its twenty-seven
amendments, there is only one repeated phrase,38 which is the elevenword phrase that appears both in the Fifth Amendment and the
Fourteenth Amendment, “deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”39
Ironically, while the Fifth amendment protects an individuals
due process rights it does not require federal government to do so
equally. Missing from the Fifth Amendment is the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection clause. Although the Fourteenth
Amendment only applies to the states, the Supreme Court applied it
through reverse incorporation to the federal government.40 The
Supreme Court applied the Equal Protection clause to the federal
government through a series of cases, through the Fifth Amendment’s
due process clause. Prior to reverse incorporation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court took notable steps to ensure that no legislature
or executive body could impugn the rights of the people by
selectively incorporating the protections of the Bill of Rights
rendering them applicable to the states. 41 The Court explained that
the test for holding an amendment applicable to the states through the
confidence of our fellow citizens, in proportion as we fortify the rights of the
people against the encroachment of the government.” Id.
35
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
36
Constitutional Interpretation, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-2/clause1/constitutional-interpretation (last visited Mar. 15, 2020).
37
Id.
38
Due
Process,
CORNELL
L.
SCH.
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/due_process (last visited Mar. 30, 2020).
39
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV§ 1.
40
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).
41
See; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436.
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Fourteenth Amendment is whether the right protected is among those
“fundamental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all
our civil and political institutions.”42
While the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are textually
different, their protections and promises apply together since the Fifth
now ensures the protections of the Fourteenth to the federal
government.43 This guarantee to apply the laws equally, to all
persons, and is present in many of the re-entry after removal cases. It
is arguably the most important of the many promises made by the
federal government to its permanent residents. It is an assurance that
the federal government will operate within the law and provide fair
procedures as part of its legal obligation to its residents.44
Like many provisions in the Constitution the Court’s interpretation in
the early years, the due process clause’s legal meaning was
consistently interpreted narrowly.45 In the late nineteenth century,
Congress held the unconstrained power to admit or expel immigrants
from the country.46 At this time, the Bill of Rights placed no
judicially enforceable barrier to congressional action regarding
immigration policies.47 During this time, the application of the Fifth
Amendment was strict, immigration cases, and the Court gave great
deference to executive officers such as immigration judges for filling
the development and establishment of the record, findings of fact, and
prompt adjudication.48
A party must have demonstrated a
fundamental unfairness in the process in order to establish that the
government deprived her of sufficient life, liberty, or property
interests.49 The findings of fact were not subject to judicial review
unless a court was expressly authorized to do so.50

42

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).
The equal protection clause prevents the state government from enacting laws
that arbitrarily discriminate. The Fifth Amendment due process clause extends this
prohibition to the federal government if the discrimination violates due process of
law.
44
Due Process, supra note 37.
45
Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
46
Neuman, supra note 2, at 618.
47
Id. at 619.
48
United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2004).
49
Ashki v INS, 233 F.3d 913, 921 (6th Cir.2000).
50
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892); see The Japanese
Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 98 (1903).
43
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Recently, courts have held that immigrants who are subject to
removal upon initial entry have far fewer rights than immigrants
subject to removal after entry. 51 Courts justify this by reasoning that
“immigrants possess constitutional rights outside the immigration
process and they generally possess constitutional procedural rights
within the immigration process. But their substantive constitutional
rights may not effectively constrain congressional deportation policy,
and courts will apparently not protect them from being deported.”52
Furthermore, the Fifth Amendment guarantees immigrants,
throughout deportation proceedings, the due process right of
procedural fairness by affording them a full and fair hearing. 53 This
crucial Amendment ensures the protection of individual rights and
prohibits the federal government from abusing its power over
individual defendants during legal proceedings.
Modern
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment by the Supreme Court 54 as it
relates to immigration provides for great protections in immigration
hearings that are currently not being observed. 55 Informing an
immigrant of her right to seek discretionary relief should be protected
as a procedural due process right under the Fifth Amendment. The
burden on the government to inform the immigrant is not so onerous
as to vastly expand the cost of administrative proceedings or
timeliness and the benefit to the accused is incomparable. If this
procedural right of advisement were not observed, it could lead to
unlawful deportation of immigrants, who have legal standing to
remain in the United States, at the discretion of the immigration
judge. Expanded awareness of discretionary relief to those accused
of illegal re-entry will not change the outcome of every removal case
but, it will safeguard the due process protections that are guaranteed
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
A critical procedural right that should never be compromised
is the right to be fully informed of discretionary relief. Due process
mandates that the federal government should use appropriate methods
or procedures to ensure its actions do not deprive an individual of

51

Castro v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, 163 F.Supp. 3d 157, 158 (E. D. Pa.
2016).
52
Neuman, supra, note 2 at, 620.
53
United States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885, 888 (6th Cir. 2017).
54
Neuman, supra, note 2 at, 635.
55
Id.
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life, liberty, or property.56 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments—
as well as several statutes—guarantee immigrants specific procedural
protections in the same way that they do for naturalized U.S.
citizens.57 Any denial of these foundational individual rights could
constitute an abuse of discretion by the Executive Branch.58
Earlier in the Nineteenth Century, the Supreme Court ruled on
seminal due process cases that became known as the Slaughter-house
Cases.59 The Court reasoned that due process is purely procedural
and that the enactment of the law via the democratic process was
itself, due process on its face. 60 The majority opinion, though no
longer applicable61, took a textualist approach in analyzing the
Fourteenth Amendment, stating that the amendment itself makes
distinctions between United States citizenship and state citizenship. 62
This distinction supported the Court’s reasoning that the Framers did
not design the Amendment to extend the privileges and immunities
outlined in the Bill of Rights onto the individual states.63
In doing so, this Court changed the course of history and set
the United States on the painstaking case by case review to determine
if such action by the government offends those canons of decency
and fairness, which have come to be known as selective
incorporation.64 However, others believe that the due process clause
does include protections of substantive due process. In a dissenting
opinion, Justice Field wrote that “the Due Process Clause protected
individuals from state legislation that infringed upon their ‘privileges

56

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).
58
Baires v. I.N.S., 856 F.2d 89, 91 (9th Cir. 2004). (Holding that immigration
judge's denial of alien's request for continuance of asylum hearing and change of
venue violated alien's statutory and regulatory procedural rights.)
59
Slaughter-house Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 74 (1872).
60
Id.
61
Although the Court's decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases has never been
explicitly overturned, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries an ideologically
conservative Court would adopt Justice Field's judicial views, interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment as a protection not of civil rights but of economic liberties.
Later, these views would blossom to provide many other unenumerated rights
ranging from a woman’s right to choose to the right to marry freely regardless of
gender or sexual orientation.
62
Slaughter-house Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 74 (1872).
63
Id.
64
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
57
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and immunities’ under the federal Constitution.”65 In his dissent,
Justice Field argued that the Privileges and Immunities Clause set
forth in the Fourteenth Amendment protected all privileges and
immunities from state encroachment, not just those secured by the
federal government.66 Constitutional scholars view this as one of the
first steps toward the modern doctrine of substantive due process, a
theory that the Court has developed to defend rights that are not
enumerated in the Constitution.67 The Slaughter-house Cases’
dissent, which is now seen as the correct legal conclusion, is an
example of protection of unenumerated due process rights. The right
of discretionary relief should be treated as an unenumerated right and
protected right under the due process clause. Providing the person
with this protection will ensure a fair hearing before an immigration
judge who has quasi-judicial and quasi-executive power and can use
them to infringe rights in an effort to promote efficiency and expedite
results. Similarly, it is the goal of this Note to promote that
unenumerated rights with respect to informing immigrants of
discretionary relief are fundamental to immigrants facing deportation
and their continued protection is necessary for all persons regardless
of citizenship status.
The dissent in the Slaughter-house Cases has given rise to
many personal liberties that we hold dear today. 68 Justice Field’s
dissent vehemently argued that the majority’s overly narrow
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment virtually gutted the
Amendment of its protections, and this approach disenfranchised
individual due process rights.69 He urged the Court to take a broader
view of the amendment and encouraged the presumption in favor of
universal individual rights. 70 The language of the Amendment does
not explicitly protect the right to same-sex marriage, religious
liberties, or female reproductive choice. However, it has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court to imply protections for these

65

Slaughter-house Cases, 83 U.S. at 74 (Field, J., dissenting).
Id.
67
Magna
Carta:
Muse
and
Mentor,
LIBR.
OF
CONG.,
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/magna-carta-muse-and-mentor/due-process-oflaw.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2019).
68
Slaughter-house Cases, 83 U.S. at74 (Field, J., dissenting).
69
Id.
70
Id.
66
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essential fundamental liberties that we enjoy as citizens of the United
States.71
Generally, the right to be informed of discretionary relief at a
deportation hearing would fall under the umbrella of procedural due
process rights. Procedural due process rights protect a person if the
government acts in such a way as to deprive the individual of life,
liberty or property interests. Judge Friendly outlined some common
types of procedural guarantees, including notice, an opportunity to be
heard before an unbiased tribunal, and an opportunity to present
reasons why the proposed action should not be taken.72 Judge
Friendly’s article both raises and answers many questions regarding
the extent of the hearing required and the balance of individual rights
versus the expenditure of bureaucracy. 73 The Court has elaborated on
the notice requirement and stated that due process is a guarantee and
not merely an act of legislative grace. 74 Therefore, since notice is a
part of procedural due process and due process is guaranteed by the
Constitution and not conferred, informing an immigrant of
discretionary relief should become a part of the notice requirement.
Other scholars have compared the practical application of
notice requirements to a cost benefit analysis, explaining that the
more expensive the additional procedures will be the less likely the
Court will require them.75 Additional aspects of the analysis include
weighing the benefit of the interest to the individual. 76 The more
important the interest to the individual, the more likely the Court will
require procedural safeguards to protect that interest.77 Finally, the
more the Court believes that the additional procedural components
will promote more accurate and less erroneous decisions, the more
likely it is the Court will require the procedures. 78 An independent
tribunal will provide more accurate decisions if it can use all
available forms of relief. Since the relative cost of the procedure is
minimal, if anything at all, it should be found that this procedural
71

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); see also Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 68 (1947); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
72
Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
73
Id. at 1276.
74
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
75
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, § 7.3
at 451; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
76
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, at 451.
77
Id.
78
Id.
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safeguard is constitutionally protected under procedural due process
rights.
Within the entangled web of individual due process issues lies
the immigrant, who ultimately wants to remain in the United States.
Our nation ideally strives to provide due process rights to those most
vulnerable. The founders of the Constitution had certain principles in
mind when they created the Constitution. As times have changed, we
can now say that even non-citizens are afforded these rights in
accordance with the Constitution’s principals. Even though this
particular issue is confined to immigration courts, the rights infringed
upon relate to all the residents of the country. We cannot lose sight
of the individual throughout this daunting deportation process.
Although, there may have been wrongs committed that brought the
immigrant before this court, these wrongs do not give executive
officials carte blanche to ignore rights of the people who have their
entire life at stake. Further, this is analogous to a criminal conviction
for murder of an individual that does not receive their Miranda rights.
This individual has admitted wrongdoing much like the immigrant
before the immigration court. However, in a criminal context, if this
evidence were admitted it would be a constitutional violation and
would be grounds for reversal. The principle behind this analogy is
not so much the reason the proceeding is happening in the first place
but rather the importance of ensuring a fundamentally fair
opportunity to be heard before an impartial tribunal. If the immigrant
is not afforded this opportunity it could amount to a deprivation
which should result in a reversal much like that of a criminal without
the opportunity to have been read their Miranda rights. This
individual often has the most at stake as she could face deportation,
family separation, criminal charges, and a return to the dire situation
she originally wanted to escape. 79 The obligation we have as a nation
to this particular individual is to ensure their due process rights are
continually protected and not to neglect these essential values based
on citizenship status.
Procedural due process applies to non-citizens in the United
States because the Fifth Amendment applies to “all persons born or
naturalized in United States . . . are citizens of the United States.”80
This amendment confers these rights on immigrants who enter the
79
80

U.S. v. Copeland III, 369 F. Supp. 2d 275, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
U.S. CONST. amend. V§ 1.
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United States legally or illegally by use of the words “all persons.”81
Failure to inform an immigrant of the availability of a particular form
of relief inherently abridges a privilege to a fair hearing and deprives
the defendant of meaningful judicial review. This is because the
right is theoretically waived rendering the decision procedurally
sound and therefore not subject to appeal. Thus, this process is
inherently unfair because there would be no grounds to appeal as
there would technically be no erroneous items on the record, yet the
process still serves to deprive an individual of rights that should be
protected. The lack of judicial review is an egregious violation of her
due process rights that are guaranteed and secured by the Fifth
Amendment and conferred upon the states through the Fourteenth
Amendments due process clause.82
B.

Sixth Amendment

Duncan v. Louisiana 83 is the landmark case that confers the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial onto the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. 84 It is not a stretch to analogize a criminal
trial to an immigration hearing. In fact, it has been argued that
criminal procedure norms have been disproportionally included into
these “civil” proceedings.85 Some commonalities that are beginning
to take hold are those increasingly similar to criminal punishment. 86
The Sixth Amendment states explicitly, “the accused shall . . . be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the assistance of counsel for his defense.” 87 The injustice that is
occurring in many immigration courts is overwhelming, and the
concealment of potential defenses and available forms of relief in
immigration hearings should be unconstitutional.
81

Id.
United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1047-10 (9th Cir. 2003).
83
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
84
Id. at 148.
85
See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
469, 471 (2007).
86
Id. (“The underlying theories of deportation increasingly resemble those of
criminal punishment. Preventive detention and plea bargaining, longstanding
staples of the criminal justice system, have infiltrated the deportation process.”).
87
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
82
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Although deportation is technically a civil proceeding, it is
becoming increasingly similar to criminal prosecutions.88 These
proceedings are criminal in nature because the basis for their
deportation is a violation of the United States Code. These
individuals are detained pending their hearing which is generally
never the case with civil proceedings. Further, in these immigration
proceedings the government is bringing the case against the
immigrant and not an individual which is another similarity to
criminal proceeding as opposed to civil. Many view the deportation
proceeding merely as a “second bite at the apple” for the
government.89
Some have called this phenomenon the
criminalization of immigration law or “crimigration.”90 This theory
suggests that the government has multiple opportunities to prosecute
alleged offenders and often if the initial proceeding results in a guilty
plea it is seemingly “definite, immediate and largely automatic” that
removal will follow.91 The gap between the criminal proceeding and
the administrative proceeding has diminished substantially. 92 The
distinct lack of independent administrative review is startling and the
melding of the criminal and immigration courts is increasing. 93 After
a conviction, there is virtually no independent review and seemingly
the deportation order receives its rubber stamp from Department of
Homeland Security and the individual may be removed without
having a hearing of any kind or be presented with any form of
relief.94 Although these hearings generally do not carry criminal
penalties and are seen as civil or “ministerial” they afford the
88

See, e.g., Austin T. Fragomen, The Uncivil Nature of Deportation: Fourth and
Fifth Amendment Rights and the Exclusionary Rule, 45 BROOK. L. REV. 29, 3435 (1978).
89
Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Legal Construction of Immigration
Removal for Crimes, 27 YALE J. REG. 47, 68 (2010) ("We find that removal in
fact functions as punishment and that immigration law and its enforcement
infrastructure have changed to such an extent in the past two decades that removal
has become a direct consequence of many convictions for noncitizens.").
90
See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic
Boundaries of the Post-September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 639, 640 (2004) (noting that a trend toward increased convergence of the
criminal justice and immigration control systems has been apparent since the
1980s).
91
Maureen A. Sweeney, supra note 84, at78 (2010).
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
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government the same result. 95 Perhaps a worse outcome is that these
hearings generally result in the successful punishment of offenders.96
After the hearing concludes, it is likely the offenders will
subsequently be removed from the United States. 97 The intersection
of criminal prosecutions and immigration courts are still increasing.
The government has begun to attach criminal consequences to
immigration violations.98
The intersection between criminal proceedings and
immigration hearings may be inevitable.
However, what is
disturbing to many is that only the negatives associated with criminal
prosecutions are being imported into immigration hearings.99 There
is a distinct absence of the protections available in a criminal
prosecution because the deportation hearings are considered civil
proceedings.100 Some imports from the criminal system that may
help the immigrant is the burden proof. The burden is noticeably
more difficult in criminal cases, as it lies with the government to
prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt. Civil burden lies with
the plaintiff to prove their own case against the defendant. In order to
ensure due process, we need a to import criminal due process
protections into the immigration context. That way the immigrant
should be informed of his right to discretionary relief to avoid
deportation. This can be likened to that of a criminal being read his
Miranda rights. The import of criminal context in immigration courts
should not be unilaterally negative for the accused, if the government
is going to use criminal procedure in immigration to its advantage it
should also import its significant defenses as well. Since there is a
current circuit split, the Supreme Court could accept a case and make
a ruling to settle the split or, the legislative branch needs to pass
legislation ensuring that discretionary relief is disclosed at every case.

95

Id.
Id.
97
Id.
98
See generally Legomsky, supra note 80, at 471-472.
99
Id.; see e.g., Maureen A. Sweeney, supra note 84, at 78; Ramanujan Nadadur,
Beyond “Crimigration” and the Civil-Criminal Dichotoomy—Applying Mathews v.
Eldridge in the Immigration Context, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 141, 146-147
(2013).
100
Legomsky, supra, note 80, at 481.
96

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021

15

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 [2021], Art. 15

930
III.

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
A.

Immigration and Nationality Act

Since passage of the McCarren-Walter Act of 1952101, the
United States government enacted federal statutes that have made a
number of revisions to immigration law including major overhauls in
1965, 1990, and 1996.102 This body of legislation is known as the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Since 1952, there have
been multiple pieces of new legislation that have impacted
immigration law, such as the INA of 1965 and the INA of 1990. 103
The 1962 amendment ended the use of formulas, which privileged
immigrants from those countries that previously dominated
immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. These
privileged immigrants generally came from European countries and
resulted in a disproportionate entry of European immigrants over
other nationalities.104 The 1965 law was based on reuniting
immigrant families and attracting adept newcomers to the United
States.105
The 1990 law, which has since been superseded by the 1996
amendments to the INA, collected and codified many existing
provisions and reorganized the structure of immigration law. 106 The
Act covers a wide range of issues from asylum to the discussion of
discretionary relief at a removal hearing, which is the central issue of
this Note.107 The Act defines an alien as “any person not a citizen or
national of the United States.”108 The INA sets forth the guidelines in
proceedings regarding immigrants and the rights they have at these
hearings.109 The INA is vast and an all-encompassing list of its
provisions is beyond the scope of this Note. However, generally an
immigrant is entitled to an expeditious public hearing, notice of the
101

Pub.L. 82–414, 66 Stat. 163, enacted June 27, 1952.
U.S. Immigration Timeline, supra note 1.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Immigration and Nationality Act, U. S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SER.,
https://www.uscis.gov/legal-resources/immigration-and-nationality-act (last visited
Mar. 27, 2021).
107
8 U.S.C. § 1326(d).
108
Id. § 1101 (a)(3).
109
Id. § 1229a (b)(4).
102
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proceeding, a right to counsel, a right to introduce evidence, examine
witnesses in an effort to develop a record on which the judge will
make the removal decision. The process is exceptionally daunting,
even for a person with knowledge of the law and it is virtually
impossible for someone with little or no knowledge of the law or the
language being spoken in the courtroom to handle the process.110
Given these inherent disadvantages many defendants face, it is
essential that the immigration judge be thorough and aid in the
finding of fact.111
Since the late 1980s, there have been many developments in
the area of immigration law including the Immigration Nationality
Act of 1990, which increased immigration into the United States
making the use of § 1326(d) by immigration courts more prevalent.
This Act expanded the number of immigrants allowed to enter the
United States up to 700,000 and introduced various visa programs
such as the lottery visa from low admittance countries, family-based
visas, and five distinct employment visas. 112 The decades following
this decision observed an ever-increasing societal animus toward
immigrants in the United States. 113
Cham v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 445 F.3d 683, 686 (3d Cir. 2006)
The case now before us exemplifies the “severe wound. . .
inflicted” when not a modicum of courtesy, of respect, or of any
pretense of fairness is extended to a petitioner and the case he so
valiantly attempted to present. Yet once again, under the
“bullying” nature of the immigration judge's questioning, a
petitioner was ground to bits. That immigration judge's conduct
has been condemned in prior opinions of this court.
Id.;
see, e.g., Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 637–38 (3d Cir.
2006) (explaining the behavior of the immigration judge as “intemperate and biasladen remarks”, “none of which had any basis in the facts introduced, or the
arguments made, at the hearing”); Fiadjoe v. Att’y General, 411 F.3d 135, 143,
145–46, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2005). The Court of Appeals Judge Debevoise described
the immigration judge as “bullying” and “brow beating.” Id. at 155. They
explained the IJ’s conduct as “continuing hostility towards the obviously distraught
[petitioner] and his abusive treatment of her throughout the hearing,” often
reducing her “to an inability to respond” Id. at 145, 154.
111
United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2004).
112
Immigration and Nationality Act, U. S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SER.,
https://www.uscis.gov/legal-resources/immigration-and-nationality-act (last visited
Mar. 27, 2021).
113
Tisha R. Tallman, Liberty, Justice, and Equality: An Examination of Past,
Present, and Proposed Immigration Policy Reform Legislation, 30 N.C. J. INT’L L.
& COM. REG. 869, 886-887 (2005) (“As a result of the IRCA, California saw
110
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Immigrants are guaranteed the right to representation by
counsel, the right to examine the evidence against the immigrant, and
present evidence.114 However, the INA does not entitle an immigrant
to an application for discretionary relief. 115 Further, the federal code
defines discretionary relief as an Attorney General’s authority to
waive inadmissibility for certain immigrants with criminal
convictions.116 The Attorney General may exercise a waiver if he is
satisfied that denying the immigrant’s admission would result in
extreme hardship to the immigrant’s spouse, children, or parent who
is a United States citizen.117 If the Attorney General has consented to
the immigrant’s applying or reapplying for a visa, for admission to
the United States, or adjustment of status then, at his discretion, the
Attorney General may grant the waiver for temporary stay.118
Ultimately, the Attorney General enforces federal
immigration law through the Executive Office for Immigration
Review. There primary mission is to adjudicate immigration cases by
fairly, expeditiously and uniformly interpreting and administering the
Nation’s immigration laws.119 The role of the Attorney General or
his designee in immigration matters has been significant since the
post-World War II era and continues today.120 In United States ex rel
Knauff v. Shaughnessy,121 the Supreme Court defined the Attorney
General’s crucial role in adjudicating immigration issues.122 In that
post World War II case, the wife of an army veteran was attempting
to enter the country but the Assistant Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization recommended that she be permanently excluded
given her affiliation with Germany. 123 The Attorney General
followed this recommendation and barred the spouse from entrance

another wave of anti-immigrant sentiment which manifested with the introduction
of more exclusionary legislation, including denial of services to undocumented
persons and denial of in-state tuition to undocumented students.”).
114
8 U.S.C. § 1229a (b)(4).
115
Id.
116
Id. § 1182 (d)(4).
117
Id.
118
Id. § 1182 (h)(1-2).
119
United States Dept. of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office (last
visited May 23, 2021.)
120
Id.
121
United States ex rel Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950).
122
Id.
123
Id.
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without a hearing. 124 The Court held that the Attorney General was
acting lawfully within his congressionally delegated powers and that
he had the discretion to carry out the interests of the executive
branch.125 Further, the Court stated that no court could review the
determination of the political branch of government to exclude an
immigrant, and the decision of the Attorney General is conclusive. 126
Thus, the interpretation of the INA by the Attorney General
and members of the executive branch plays a determinative role in
how the statute operates. The statute’s interpretation by these
participants provides structure to the practical application of the
INA.127 The statute defines what re-entry after removal is and the
rights and limitations of immigrants who are present at these
hearings.128 The statute defines a reentrant as a person who “has
been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation,
or removal is outstanding, and after that enters, attempts to enter, or
is at any time found in, the United States.” 129 The statute further
provides that any immigrant who has been deported and afterwards
enters the United States is guilty of a felony. 130 The statute also
outlines the limitations of a collateral attack against the deportation
order.131
The three elements necessary to sustain a collateral attack in a
immigration proceeding under § 1326 are: the exhaustion of
administrative remedies; deprivation of judicial review; and the entry
of the order was fundamentally unfair. 132 The statute explicitly states
that an immigrant bears the burden of proving all three of these
elements in order to overrule the deportation order and remain in the
United States.133 The current circuit court split, and the premise of
this Note, surrounds the issue of whether failure to inform an
immigrant of the opportunity for discretionary relief rises to the level
124

Id. at 540-41.
Id.
126
Id.
127
See generally John O. McGinnis, Introduction, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 21, 21-28
(1993).
128
8 U.S.C. § 1229a (b)(4).
129
Id. § 1326(a)(1)(2).
130
Id.
131
Id. § 1326(d).
132
Id.
133
Id.
125
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of being fundamentally unfair under the third prong of the statute. 134
The statute is unclear regarding the level of unfairness required to
sustain a collateral attack on an immigration order. The plain
language of the statute, makes it clear that the immigrant bears the
burden of proof in these matters.135
B.

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Acts of 1996

Congress attempted to deal with immigration issues by
enacting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 136
(“AEDPA”) and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act137 (“IIRIRA”). The AEDPA limits the ability of
federal courts to grant procedural and substantive habeas corpus
relief.138 Procedurally, it requires all claims of a criminal defendant
to be consolidated into one appeal. 139 Substantively, it shrinks the
grounds on which a defendant can make a successful habeas claim
for convictions contrary to an “unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence.”140
The IIRIRA revolutionized the process of immigrant entry
into the United States by replacing the term “entry” with “admission”
and ultimately expanding government rights to detain and deport
C. ALLIE SEGREST, IMMIGRATION LAW—THE CURRENT SPLIT ON AN
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANT’S CONSTITUTION RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF
DISCRETIONARY RELIEF—UNITED STATES V. ESTRADA, 876 F.3D 885 (6TH CIR.
2017), 41 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 673.
134

135

8 U.S.C. § 1326(d).
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in various sections of §§ 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, 42
U.S.C.).
137
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in various sections of §§ 8,
18 U.S.C.).
138
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), CORNELL L.
SCH.
LEG.
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/antiterrorism_and_effective_death_penalty_act_o
f_1996_(aedpa) (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
139
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in various sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42
U.S.C.).
140
28 U.S.C. § 2254.
136
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immigrants.141 The Act strengthened U.S. immigration laws by
adding penalties for undocumented immigrants found in the U.S. 142
These amendments ultimately did not have the effect Congress
intended. Congress intended to clarify and declutter immigration
policy by passing a new law. 143 However, Congress ultimately overcomplicated an already complex area of the law by introducing over
fifty new deportable offenses and a new form of discretionary relief
available to a very narrow class of immigrants.144
IV.

SUPREME COURT CASES

The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to hear a case concerning
whether all immigrants have a fundamental right in re-entry after
removal hearings to be informed of the availability of discretionary
relief.145 However, the Court has consistently found that the First
Amendment, as well as the due process clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments , extend their protections to all persons,
whether citizens or resident immigrants, against any encroachment. 146
The Supreme Court has held that the government must protect an
immigrant’s due process rights.147 Specifically, the government must
141

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996110 Stat.
3009-546.
142
Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, CORNELL L. SCH.
LEG.
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/illegal_immigration_reform_and_immigration_re
sponsibility_act (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
143
Anthony Distinti, Gone but Not Forgotten: How Section 212(c) Relief Continues
to Divide Courts Presiding Over Indictments for Illegal Reentry, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2809, 2822 (2006);
144
Anthony Distinti, Gone but Not Forgotten: How Section 212(c) Relief Continues
to Divide Courts Presiding Over Indictments for Illegal Reentry, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2809, 2822 (2006); Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Responsibility
Act,
CORNELL
L.
SCH.
LEG.
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/illegal_immigration_reform_and_immigration_re
sponsibility_act (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
145
United States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885, 886 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.
Ct. 2623 (2018).
146
See Kim, supra note 4.
147
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953). (Kwong was a seaman who
was deported without a hearing pursuant to an Attorney General exclusion order.
The Court found the Attorney General did not possess the authority to deny an
immigrant the right to be heard in opposition of an order which permanently
excluded the immigrant.)
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provide notice of the charges against him, a hearing before an
impartial executive or administrative tribunal, and a fair opportunity
to be heard.148 The Supreme Court observed that in cases arising out
of illegal entry, the entrant is entitled to a fair trial, a fair opportunity
to be heard, and that trial must meet the standards of impartiality. 149
In the last forty years several Supreme Court cases have made
an important impact on this very narrow issue of the right to be
informed of discretionary relief. Some of these cases eventually
changed the course of immigration law in the United States. 150 Two
immigration cases that had a particular impact on Congress are the
opinions rendered in United States v. Mendoza-Lopez151 and I.N.S. v.
St. Cyr152 which were ultimately codified and subsequently
superseded by statute. Prior to Mendoza-Lopez, § 1326(d) was only
recognized in case law. Congress saw its importance and thus
worked to draft legislation that essentially mirrored the decision in
Mendoza-Lopez. In Mendoza-Lopez, a Mexican national was arrested
and deported after a group hearing and was subsequently found in the
United States.153 He was again arrested and scheduled for a removal
after re-entry hearing.154 The Court held that the unavailability of
effective judicial review violated the defendant’s due process
rights.155 The Court stated that an immigrant has a due process right
to require a collateral review of any deportation order.156 The Court
limited this right, however, finding that the accused cannot
collaterally attack the order if the requirements which later became §
1326(d), exhaustion of administrative remedies, deprivation of
judicial review, and the order was fundamentally unfair, are not
met.157 Congress amended § 1326(d) to reflect the Courts findings
and codify these three requirements. 158 Now, an immigrant seeking
collateral attack of a deportation order would rely on § 1326(d) and
its elements rather than Mendoza-Lopez.
148

Id. at 597-598.
Id.
150
See Distinti, supra note 129.
151
481 U.S. 828 (1987).
152
533 U.S. 289 (2001).
153
481 U.S. 828.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
8 U.S.C. § 1326(d).
149
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Similarly, in 2001, the Supreme Court heard the case, INS v.
St. Cyr,159 which also had a rippling effect in Congress. Prior to St.
Cyr, in 1996, Congress drafted IIRIRA which limited review of final
deportation orders and stated that district courts did not have proper
jurisdiction to hear these appeals. 160 Such appeals would need to be
heard directly by courts of appeals. 161 However, Congress did not
make explicitly clear what would happen if the appeal was brought
on habeas corpus grounds. In St. Cyr, a permanent resident
immigrant filed a petition for habeas corpus, seeking a review of the
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (B.I.A.).162 The
government ordered the defendant’s removal because he pled guilty
to an aggravated felony. 163 St. Cyr appealed and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.164 The court found that IIRIRA did not eliminate
district court review via habeas corpus of constitutional or legal
challenges to final removal orders.165 Subsequently, The REAL ID
Act clarified that final orders of removal may not be reviewed in
district courts, even via habeas corpus.166 Both cases are now
superseded by statute.
This unique area of the law simultaneously retains aspects of
ministerial proceedings and criminal prosecutions, requires an indepth review of procedural due process, and the government’s role in
the safeguard of that constitutional right. The Supreme Court has
long held that immigration control has been a key aspect of the
sovereignty of the United States.167 In Chae Chan Ping v. United
States,168 the Court held the government may limit procedural rights
granted to noncitizens.169 Since then the Court’s decision in Mathews
v. Eldridge170 gave much needed guidance on procedural due process
159

533 U.S. 289 (2001).
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in various sections of §§ 8,
18 U.S.C.).
161
Id.
162
533 U.S. 289, 293.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S.Ct. 1683, 1690 (2020).
166
Id.
167
Nadadur, supra note 92, at 142-143; see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States,
130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
168
130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
169
Id.
170
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
160
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review and infringement of such rights by government entities. 171 In
Mathews, the state informed Mr. Eldridge that he was no longer
eligible for social security disability benefits because according to his
medical records his disability ceased in May 1972.172 Eldridge
disputed the claim, and rather than seeking reconsideration by the
state agency he filed a federal lawsuit seeking an injunction to retain
his benefits.173 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
injunction.174 The Court held that for an administrative procedure to
meet constitutional guarantees, the court must apply a three factor
balancing test. The court must weigh three factors: (1) the private
interest at stake in the administrative action, (2) the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of this interest through the procedures used and
the probative value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest. 175 This includes the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
additional substitute procedural benefit would entail. 176 The Court
engaged in a balancing test to determine if the current procedure was
adequate compared to the alternative procedure requested. 177 The
court noted that additional administrative and societal costs coupled
with little to no added value of the additional requirements requested
would be too much of a burden. 178
The balancing of the Mathews factors lends itself directly to
immigration removal hearings as there are individual interests at
stake as well as administerial burdens to consider. Here, the accused
faces a significant deprivation of a liberty interest, to be free and live
in the United States. Weighed against the interest of the government,
the burden and cost of implementation of ensuring discretionary
relief is explained in all hearings where it is applicable.179
Seemingly, the burden is rather small.
The burden on the
government is to advise all eligible candidates of their right to seek
discretionary relief. However, this will undoubtedly increase the
number of applications for discretionary relief significantly.
171

Nadadur, supra note 92, at 142-143.
Id. at 324.
173
Id. at 325.
174
Id. at 325-26.
175
424 U.S. 319, 334-335.
176
Id. at 335.
177
Id. at 334-335.
178
Id. at 349.
179
Id.
172
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Additionally, the increasing number of applications will directly
impact administrative costs and caseloads for already overworked
immigration judges. The argument section will discuss how the
importance of the immigrant’s liberty interest exceeds the cost and
burden on the government.
V.

EXAMINING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

Over the past decade, there has been an intriguing increase in
litigation in the federal circuit courts surrounding the fundamental
fairness element of § 1326(d).180 All of the federal circuits courts
have a consensus on the criteria constituting what is “fundamentally
unfair.”181 In order “to prove the fundamental unfairness of an
underlying deportation order, a defendant must show both a due
process violation emanating from defects in the underlying
deportation proceeding and resulting prejudice.”182 Although an
agreement exists on the requirements of proving fundamental
unfairness, there is a federal circuit split on the issue of whether
failure to inform an immigrant of his right to discretionary relief
violates the defendant’s constitutional rights and renders the
proceeding fundamentally unfair under § 1326(d)(3).183
The prevailing position for the majority of circuit courts is
that immigrants do not have a due process right to be informed of the
right to discretionary relief from deportation. 184 The courts go on to
further state that the failure to advise does not render the procedure
“fundamentally unfair.”185 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit best
outlines the majority view by formulating three distinct but related
requirements that must be met by an immigrant wishing to challenge

180

SEGREST, supra note 120, at 676-677.
Id.; see also United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Estrada,
876 F.3d 885 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225 (5th Cir.
2002); United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 2004); Smith v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 425 (4th
Cir. 2002); Oguejiofor v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 277 F.3d 1305 (11th
Cir. 2002); Escudero–Corona v. INS, 244 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2002).
182
Estrada, 876 F.3d at 888.
183
SEGREST, supra note 120, at 676-677.
184
Distinti, supra note 128, at 2825.
185
Id.
181
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the use of a prior deportation or removal order. 186 In the Fifth
Circuit, the immigrant must establish that (1) the prior hearing was
“fundamentally unfair”; (2) the hearing effectively eliminated the
right of the immigrant to challenge the hearing by means of judicial
review of the order; and (3) the procedural deficiencies caused the
immigrant actual prejudice.187 This three-pronged test established by
the Fifth Circuit nearly mirrors the federal code Section 1326(d).
In United States v. Lopez-Vasquez,188 the Fifth Circuit took a
hardline procedural approach. Specifically, the court stated that if the
Government followed the federal procedure for expedited removal of
immigrants, and the immigrant did not raise an allegation that the
Government violated his due process rights, his removal was not
fundamentally unfair.189 In United States v. Benitez-Villafuerte190 the
Fifth Circuit explained its definition of prejudice. In this connection:
A showing of prejudice means “there was a reasonable
likelihood that but for the errors complained of the
defendant would not have been deported” [or
removed]. In short, “if the defendant was legally
deportable, and despite the I.N.S.’s errors, the
proceeding ‘could not have yielded a different result,’
the deportation is valid for purposes of section
1326.”191
The Fifth Circuit court is attempting to show that even with
the INS errors, if there is no other reasonable result that could have
developed from the proceedings, the deportation stands.192 This is
most similar to a harmless error argument where although there was
some defect in the process it was not egregious and dispositive of the
ultimate outcome.193
United States v. Lopez-Ortiz194 is the leading case that held
that failure to inform an immigrant of discretionary relief does not
186

United States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 227 F.3d 476, 483 (5th Cir. 2000).
Id.
188
227 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2000).
189
Id. at. 483.
190
186 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1999).
191
Id. at 658-59 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Galicia-Gonzalez, 997
F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1993)).
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
313 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2002).
187
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infringe upon the due process rights of the immigrant.195 In LopezOrtiz, the defendant, Joel Lopez-Ortiz, who was a citizen of Mexico,
was convicted of felony possession of cocaine and sentenced to
removal as an aggravated felon. 196 At the removal hearing, the judge
failed to advise the defendant he was eligible to apply for § 212(c)
discretionary relief.197
In Lopez-Ortiz, the court stated that the defendant was eligible
for a discretionary waiver of removal at the time of his prior removal
proceeding.198 However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the immigration judge’s failure to inform the immigrant of his
eligibility for that waiver did not render the proceeding
fundamentally unfair.199 The Fifth Circuit in Lopez-Ortiz reasoned
that § 212(c) discretionary relief is available within the broad and
unfettered discretion of the Attorney General, and therefore
discretionary relief is not a due process right.200 This circuit has
noted that § 212(c) relief “was couched in conditional and permissive
terms. As a piece of legislative grace, it conveyed no rights, it
conferred no status,” and its denial does not implicate the due process
clause.201 Ultimately, the view of the majority is that § 212(c) does
not grant a liberty or property interest.202 Thus, it cannot qualify as a
due process violation amounting to fundamental unfairness.203
The court ultimately found that eligibility for § 212(c) relief is
not a liberty or property interest warranting due process protection. 204
Instead, the court found that relief is only at the grace of the Attorney
General.205 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held this form of
195

Id.
Id. at 227.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
See Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225.
201
Alfarache v. Cravener, 203 F.3d 381, 383 (5th Cir.2000) (quoting Cadby v.
Savoretti, 256 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir.1956)).
202
See Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225; see also United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353
F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 2004);
United States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885, 888 (6th Cir. 2017).
203
Distinti, supra note 122, at 2826-2827.
204
313 F.3d at 230-231.
205
Id.; The attorney general is appointed by the President and gives rise to the
appearance of bias and impartiality because this decision effects a person’s rights
and is made by someone at the mercy of the person implementing the policy in the
first place.
196
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relief is not a constitutionally protected due process right for two
reasons. First, that fundamental fairness is a procedural question. 206
Since deportation hearings are civil matters, immigrants do not have
the same protections that would be available to a criminal defendant.
Lopez-Ortiz presupposes that eligibility for discretionary relief under
§ 212(c) is an interest warranting constitutional protection, but the
Circuit Court disagreed.207 This court distinguished St. Cyr on a
ground that the Supreme Court found for St. Cyr through an
interpretation of the IIRIRA not INA § 212(c). The Court reasoned
that relying specifically on INA § 212(c) is solely within the
discretion of the Attorney General and can be denied as it is not
protected by due process.208 The court turned to the three factors
found in Kwong to determine if Lopez-Ortiz was provided with
sufficient protection.209 The Fifth Circuit court reasoned that the
immigrant judge’s error did not rise to a level that would interfere
with the three factors in Kwong.210 Thus, the hearing was
fundamentally fair and INA § 212(c) is not a liberty or property
interest that warranted due process protection.
The Tenth Circuit went even further in disputing the right of
immigrants to be informed of discretionary relief and defines its own
extremely narrow standard of due process. 211 Defining due process
for deportable immigrants as “an opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” 212 injects subjectivity
into the foundational principles of procedural due process.
The minority of circuits include the Second and Ninth
Circuits.213 These circuit courts recognize that the right to be
informed of the availability of discretionary relief is a due process
right.214 The right to be informed is supported by the reasoning that a
failure to be informed violates their due process rights and produces
prejudice, which in turn leads to the hearing itself becoming
206

Id. at 230.
Id. at 231.
208
Id. at 231.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2004).
212
Id.
213
See United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2003); see also
United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004).
214
See United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2003); see also
United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004).
207
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fundamentally unfair215 thus, violating the defendant’s constitutional
rights.216 These Circuits highly contest the position advanced by the
Fifth Circuit as they argue this is contrary to the very fabric of
procedural due process.217
The Second and Ninth Circuits state that a “failure to advise a
potential deportee of a right to seek Section 212(c) [discretionary]
relief can, if prejudicial, be fundamentally unfair within the meaning
of Section 1326(d)(3).”218 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit has taken a
fairly liberal stance on the interpretation of the Due Process Clause in
the context of Section 1326(d) and the right to be informed of
discretionary relief.219 The Ninth Circuit stated, “we have repeatedly
held that an I.J.’s [immigration judge] failure to so advise violates
due process and can serve as the basis for a collateral attack to a
deportation order.”220
The most progressive approach to this issue of informing an
immigrant of her eligibility for discretionary relief is discussed in the
Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa.221 In
Ubaldo-Figueroa, an immigrant was convicted by a federal
immigration judge for illegal re-entry into Southern California, and
he appealed.222 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held an
immigrant could collaterally attack a removal order underlying illegal
re-entry prosecution despite failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies.223
Explicitly, the immigration judge deprived the
immigrant of his due process rights when the judge did not inform the
immigrant of his opportunity for discretionary relief in the
immigrant’s underlying removal proceeding. 224
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that due to the immigration
judge’s failure to inform the immigrant of his right to appeal, his
deportation order deprived the immigrant of the opportunity for

215

Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d at 1048.
Id.
217
United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1047-1048 (9th Cir. 2003);
see also United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004).
218
Id.
219
United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010).
220
Id. at 897.
221
364 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2003).
222
Id. at 1047.
223
Id.
224
Id.
216
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meaningful judicial review in violation of his due process rights. 225
Therefore, immigrants could collaterally attack a removal order
underlying illegal re-entry prosecution.226 The Court of Appeals
further stated that an immigrant does not need to prove that he was
entitled to relief to establish prejudice. 227 Instead, an immigrant must
show that he had a “plausible” ground for relief from deportation.228
This court distinctly rejected the principle that discretionary relief is
at the grace of the Attorney General. 229 This court explicitly stated
that it rendered the hearing unfair if all remedies are not proffered at
removal hearings.230 Relying heavily on Mendoza-Lopez, it held that
determinations in an administrative proceeding have substantial
implications, such as criminal sanctions, and thus there must be some
meaningful judicial review. 231 This court found that not being
informed of discretionary review amounts to improper deprivation of
opportunity for meaningful judicial review under 8 U.S.C. §
1326(d)(2).232 Further, this court states only one plausible legal
challenge to his removal order is enough to amount to prejudice
because if he had known of the opportunity he could have pursued
it.233 Thus, a immigration judge’s failure to properly inform has
prejudicial effects from pursuing his plausible claim.
The Ninth Circuit has established the plausibility standard
when reviewing these discretionary decisions en banc. 234 When
reviewing discretionary decisions, the immigrant must only show
prejudice.235 To establish prejudice, the immigrant does not have to
show that he actually would have been granted relief. 236 Instead, he
must only show that he had “plausible” ground for relief from
225

Id. at 1050.
Id. at 1047.
227
Id. at 1050.
228
Id.
229
Id. (“The requirement that the IJ inform an alien of his or her ability to apply for
relief from removal is ‘mandatory,’ and ‘failure to so inform the alien [of his or her
eligibility for relief from removal] is a denial of due process that invalidates the
underlying deportation proceeding.’” (quoting United States v. Muro-Inclan, 249
F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001)))
230
Id.
231
Id. at 1048.
232
Id. at 1050.
233
Id.
234
United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2004).
235
Id. at 1050.
236
Id.
226
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deportation.237 The Ninth Circuit has adopted and relied on a
plausibility standard, which has more recently been discussed as a
reasonable possibility standard. 238
The Ninth Circuit’s
interchangeable use indicates that plausibility and reasonable
possibility may be synonymous. Recent case law cites to a
reasonable possibility standard and may even indicate less of a
burden than the plausibility standard previously established by the
Ninth Circuit.239 In practice, the above theories operate effectively
identically, and an immigration judge must inform an immigrant of
the possibility of discretionary relief if there is only a “reasonable
possibility that the petitioner may be eligible for relief.” 240
Comparably, the Second Circuit adopted the more judicially
manageable standard of reasonable probability for receiving
discretionary relief.241 The primary case arising under the Second
Circuit is United States v. Copeland.242 In Copeland, a Jamaican
citizen, had been adopted by his grandmother, a naturalized citizen of
the United States, and came to the United States at age twelve.243 He
was convicted of crimes while living as a lawful permanent alien and
was subsequently deported. 244 Upon re-entry, he was again arrested
for illegal re-entry and now faced with a second deportation
proceeding.245 The lower court held that Copeland “really did not
appreciate that he has a right to appeal” and dismissed the
indictment.246 The lower court held Copeland’s deportation order
was found to be fundamentally unfair because the immigration judge
failed to advise of the existence of discretionary relief and this
unfairness was deemed prejudicial to Copeland because there was a
reasonable probability of receiving § 212(c) relief.247
The
government appealed the decision.
The Second Circuit held that, a defendant must show both
procedural error and prejudice resulting from that error to show
237

Id.
United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2010).
239
Id.; see also Moran–Enriquez v. INS, 884 F.2d 420, 423 (9th Cir.1989).
240
629 F.3d. at 901.
241
United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2004).
242
376 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004).
243
Id. at 62.
244
Id. at 62-63.
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
Id. at 67.
238
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fundamental unfairness.248 The Second Circuit partially stood with
the Ninth Circuit in recognizing that a failure to advise a potential
deportee of a right to seek §212(c) relief can, if prejudicial, be
fundamentally unfair within the meaning of §1326(d)(3). The Second
Circuit concluded that where an alien is erroneously denied
information and the erroneous denial of that information results in
deportation that likely would have been avoided if the immigrant was
properly informed, such error is fundamentally unfair within the
meaning of §1326(d)(3).249
In the view of the Second Circuit, the defendant must show
that he likely would have been granted the relief sought if he had
obtained a hearing.250 Although there is no formal level of proof for
determining the likelihood of success at the hearing, the Second
Circuit analogizes the failure to inform with that of the standard for
ineffective counsel claims.251 The court stated that this analogy is
close-fitting because it would likely result from the failure of an
immigration judge to adequately provide the essential duties to a pro
se immigrant plaintiff.252 Thus, prejudice requires a showing that the
unprofessional errors of the sitting judge are the but-for cause of the
immigrant not being granted discretionary relief. 253
The Second Circuit takes logical steps in formulating the
desire to provide immigrants with the guaranteed protections one is
entitled to under the due process clause. 254
This approach
acknowledges the built-in disadvantages an immigrant has when
facing deportation. The Second Circuits approach acknowledges the
disparities in the adversarial system and attempts to remedy these
discrepancies.255 However, the Second Circuit does require a
defendant to show a reasonable probability that the immigrant would
have obtained relief had he or she been informed of and sought a §
212(c) hearing.256
This standard requires more than a mere
plausibility of obtaining relief which its fellow Ninth Circuit Court

248

Id. at 70.
Id. at 71.
250
Id.
251
Id. at 73.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
Id. at 71.
255
Id.
256
Id. at 74.
249
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requires.257 The Second Circuit’s ruling allows the balance that
Congress initially sought by enacting these immigration statutes and
is a better compromise than the Ninth Circuit’s approach. 258
The amendments enacted by Congress in 1996 (AEDPA and
IIRIRA) sought to reduce immigration litigation through the
restructuring of administrative appeals and judicial procedures.259
The Second Circuit engages in the necessary balancing test, which
the Supreme Court commonly engages in with regards to many
constitutional inquiries, by requiring a higher threshold of prejudice
than the Ninth Circuit but also realizing the fiscal responsibility the
court has in engaging only credible appeals.260 In doing so, the
Second Circuit uses its discretion in not overly stretching the
provisions of the clause beyond its constitutional limit. The Second
Circuit identifies the requirement of the immigrant to show that an
immigration judge committed prejudice in the handling of the
immigrant’s case in order to be successful. 261 The Second Circuit
analogizes §212(c) claims to that of ineffective counsel claims. 262
They state “prejudice is shown where there is a reasonable
probability that, but for the immigration judges unprofessional errors,
the alien would have been granted §212(c) relief.”263 The Second
Circuits approach further cements the idea of both procedural and
substantive fairness that is embedded in our nation’s Constitution.
VI.

ARGUMENT

In the Argument, Section A discusses the view that the failure
to inform an immigrant of the availability of discretionary relief is
not fundamentally unfair under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) and the majority
of circuit courts’ reasoning is grounded in a strict textualist approach
to constitutional interpretation.
Section B addresses the
countervailing progressive view that the failure to inform the
257

United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 2003); See
also United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004).
258
MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43226, AN OVERVIEW OF
JUDICIAL
REVIEW
OF
IMMIGRATION
MATTERS
(2013).
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43226.pdf.
259
Id.
260
United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 74 (2d Cir. 2004).
261
Id. at 73.
262
Id.
263
Id.
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immigrant of the opportunity to seek discretionary relief is
fundamentally unfair. This Section introduces some tests that are
currently at work in the varying Circuits and reasons why they
employ them.
A.

Failure to consider an Immigrant for Discretionary
Relief is Not Fundamentally Unfair

Proponents for the majority indicate the need for a strict
textualist interpretation of the statutes.264 The proponents emphasize
that the statute uses no “explicit mandatory language” to create a due
process right in discretionary relief and states the statute offers a
“‘mere hope’ . . . of relief.”265 Advocates for the majority lean on the
intent of Congress when it modified the Immigration and Nationality
Act in 1996.266 Relevant legislative history was nicely summed up
by then President Bill Clinton, who stated the legislation strengthened
“the rule of law by cracking down on illegal immigration at the
border, in the workplace, and in the criminal justice system —
without punishing those living in the United States legally.” 267 In
modifying existing law, Congress sought to improve border security,
encourage legal entry, enhance punishment on fraud and smuggling,
and strengthen enforcement on restrictions against employment of
and benefits received by illegal aliens. Specifically, Congress desired
expedited immigrant removal or deportation and achieved this by
reducing the scope of judicial review.268 In combination with the
legislative intent and plain language of the statute, the majority view
seeks to interpret §1326(d) narrowly.
The narrow interpretation of §1326(d) is unconstitutional. It
unnecessarily deprives immigrants of the opportunity of meaningful
judicial review. The mere fact of informing the immigrant of the
opportunity for discretionary review does not entitle him to relief.
This would not create undue burden on the immigration courts by
causing backlogs with extended hearings. The Fifth Circuit’s narrow
264

Id.; see also United States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 2004); United States
v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885, 888 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 313
F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2002).
265
United States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 2004).
266
MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, supra note 228, at 1.
267
Donald Kerwin, From IIRIRA to Trump: Connecting the Dots to the Current US
Immigration Policy Crisis, 6(3) J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC., 192, 192 (2018).
268
SEGREST, supra note 120.
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interpretation of St. Cyr is incorrect. They have held “denial of
[Section 212(c) relief] does not implicate the Due Process clause”
and therefore eligibility for such relief is not a interest warranting due
process protection.269 While it grounded some of its findings in the
IIRIRA, the Fifth Circuit generally misapplied St. Cyr. St. Cyr also
addressed § 212(c) relief specifically by stating there is definitive
difference between certain deportation and possible deportation.
These differences indicate that if discretionary relief could have made
a difference in the outcome to the immigrant it would render the
hearing fundamentally unfair. This further suggests that those
immigrants eligible for § 212(c) relief should at least be informed of
the opportunity, but, whether the court chooses to grant the relief
sought is a different inquiry entirely. The carve out created by the
Fifth Circuit disregards individual rights and shows the prevailing
injustice of encroaching criminal prosecution ideology without the
supporting criminal due process rights. Their opinion circumvents
the purpose of St. Cyr which was to provide meaningful and unbiased
review of deportation orders.
B.

Failure to Consider an Immigrant for
Discretionary Relief is Fundamentally Unfair

The Ninth Circuit has been known to make bold assertions in
the defense of civil liberties and expansive individual rights. 270
Though audacious, the adoption of the plausibility standard is
judicially unmanageable. With respect to the goals of efficiency,
balancing the paramount importance of properly informing an
immigrant of due process rights, the Ninth Circuit tips the scales
slightly too far from the center. The adoption of a plausibility
standard will most definitely create an unmanageable case load for
administrative officials.
This could have more negative
consequences than positive. It may hamper the ability of the
executive branch to effectively expedite hearings and keep all people
including the immigrant safe. The adoption of the plausibility
standard will cause undue delay for those who have more than a
269

Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d at 231.
See Al Otro Lado v. Wolf, 952 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2020). (granting preliminary
injunction preventing enforcement of a regulation on a provisionally certified class
that required asylum seekers to apply for asylum in a third country that they passed
through on their way to the southern border).
270
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plausible chance of remaining in the country. Conversely, it will
provide those who only have one infinitesimal claim, the ability to
seek review to the detriment of those whose chances of remaining are
much greater. This is a delicate balance and I do not intend to cast
aside the hopes of those who only have a plausible claim. However,
there are both monetary and humanitarian costs in adopting this broad
sweeping standard.
Section 1326 (d) of the eighth volume of the United States
Code requires the immigrant detainee to prove one of three elements
to sustain a collateral attack in a criminal proceeding.271 The
majority of disputes that pertain to the failure to inform an immigrant
of the opportunity for discretionary relief are raised under § 1326 (d)
within the third prong in the context of fundamental unfairness. The
statute’s inherent vagueness lends itself to multiple interpretations, as
we see in the analysis of the different circuit decisions.272 Although
legislative history and executive action, from President Clinton
through President Trump, may support a strict interpretation; 273 it
would be naïve and improper to think that this statute completely
eliminates judge’s discretion and case by case analysis. It would also
be so naïve to assume that the statutory language will provide a clear
and definitive direction in all cases.274
Fundamental fairness is at the heart of this debate and the
narrow interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (d) is unconstitutional.
Given the lives of individuals that hang in the balance of one
immigration judge’s discretion, either legislative or judicial action is
urgent from not only a legal perspective but—more importantly—a
humanitarian one. The Supreme Court needs to adopt a national
standard when interpreting fundamental fairness under 8 U.S.C. §
1326 (d)(3). A narrow interpretation of §1326 (d) is in contrast with
principals of equity and human rights. Immigration should not be
treated any differently than other areas of the law and is no place for
a dearth of due process especially with the import and recent
development of “crimigration.”275 Expansive unenumerated rights
have given residents of the nation the necessary protections from
government overreach. Disclosure of discretionary relief is a
271

Id.
See supra Part V.
273
See supra notes 151-233 and accompanying text.
274
Neuman, supra note 2, at 611.
275
Nadadur, supra note 92, at 145.
272
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consequential fact during a quasi-civil trial and is fundamental to
ensure fair proceedings in immigration courts and equal application
of the law in all venues. To vest the ultimate power of a person’s fate
in executive officials with broad discretion is unconstitutional based
on the broad findings of unenumerated rights in the past. The
Supreme Court has found due process to apply to many fundamental
rights, and it should be found to apply to discretionary relief at an
immigration hearing if the immigrant has a probable chance of
success.
An individual deserves to know the possible remedies
available amidst a hearing that could change the course of her life
forever.
The law as currently interpreted and applied is
unconstitutional. The current process should be modified to afford
all immigrants seeking entry into this accepting nation the same
opportunity under the law. The modification should be procedurally
minor but substantively life changing. If the detainee is eligible for
discretionary relief, the immigration judge should be required, both
statutorily and constitutionally, to read this opportunity aloud if the
opportunity would have impacted the immigrant’s fate. In cases
where this may not be clear, it should be read by the presiding
immigration judge to avoid the disparate impact the alternative could
create. The opportunity to be aware of all forms of relief that one
may be entitled to ensure that all hearings are conducted fairly and
consistently. Anything short of that is unconstitutional.
This assertion and reality for so many are unfair as a matter
not only of law but also of morality. The Second Circuit’s approach
to this issue is one that should be implemented in all 8 U.S.C. Section
1326(d) discretionary relief cases to ensure absolute fairness to all
litigants. The Second Circuit’s approach considers both sides of the
argument and attempts to compromise using sound logic. 276 It
considers the narrow majority view and acknowledges the need for
structure as a matter of law and procedure. 277 This view reinforces
the argument that an immigrant’s removal proceeding will not be
found unconstitutional unless there is a reasonable likelihood that the
disclosure of the availability of discretionary relief would have
impacted the outcome of the immigrant’s fate. This step by the

276
277

United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id.
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Second Circuit makes a necessary compromise in this area of the
law.278
In further review of advancing and developing the Second
Circuit’s position, the Court does not go so far as to overstretch the
bounds of the statute beyond its legislative intent. It acknowledges a
boundary as not to induce more litigation of violative due process
allegations as does the plausible ground standard adopted in the
progressive Ninth Circuit. Logically, if the disclosure of the
information would have impacted the outcome of the hearing, it is not
too far to state that this disclosure is fundamentally fair. The position
of the Second Circuit allows for the nondisclosure of discretionary
relief to establish fundamental unfairness. If this does not rise to the
level of a constitutional violation, it still provides the immigrant
before the tribunal a fair opportunity at remaining in the country.
The Second Circuit ultimately states that if the immigrant is
prejudiced by not being informed of § 212(c) relief, then it can be a
fundamental procedural error that does not need to be constitutionally
mandated.279 Deportation proceedings should not be clouded by
whether or not the immigrant should be informed by the immigration
judge of the availability of discretionary relief. To leave this decision
to the discretion of agents of the executive branch, who are often
more concerned with procedural efficiency as opposed to procedural
rights, is unjust. The challenge to a deportation order should not be
determinative of whether or not one is told of a particular availability
of relief. All of those who are before an immigration judge should be
afforded the full extent of due process rights including all
possibilities of available relief. The suggestion that an executive
official knows better or has the right to deprive an opportunity at
freedom is the antithesis of constitutional behavior when it comes to
procedural due process fairness.
C.

Failure to Consider an Immigrant for
Discretionary Relief is Violative of an Immigrants
Liberty Interest

The difficulty with assessing the constitutionality of not
informing a immigrant the right to discretionary relief is that there is
no clear rule to apply. Mathews set forth a general standard and
278
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several factors to follow, but jurisprudence applying Mathews is
incomplete and vague with respect to immigration controversies.
Procedural due process is situational and largely fact specific and as
stated by the Court is “flexible and calls for such procedural
protection as the particular situation demands.” 280 This section seeks
to examine the paramount liberty interest of the immigrant in
preserving wealth, family ties, and a begging of life in the United
States compared with the burden and cost on the government in
advising discretionary relief. This will be difficult to quantify but a
review is necessary.
Currently, our immigration courts face untenable backlogs of
cases and efforts to alleviate those backlogs have been categorically
unsuccessful.281 The ABA has noted that primarily the policies
forcing case quotes and limiting judges discretionary decision also
raise major procedural due process concerns.282 The ABA has also
recommended significant increase in the creation of immigration
judge positions to alleviate the backlog. 283
They have also
recommended the complete elimination of the administrative agency
and the integration into an Article 1 court in order to eliminate the
backlog.284 While these may be helpful and should be implemented,
it is apparent that the backlog is not going away. Currently there are
over one million cases pending in immigration courts compared to
only 540,000 in 2017.285 One possible solution offered by the ABA
is to “better balance the goals of enforcement priorities while still
encouraging the use of prosecutorial discretion.”286 This highlights
the importance of discretionary decisions in administrative
proceedings and supports that discretionary relief should be made
available to help eliminate the backlog of cases. Though there could
be a burden on the government as an increase of applications would
likely occur, it could have a reverse effect allowing more cases to be
dismissed through the use of judge’s discretion.
280
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The discussion of the government’s burden is only one factor
to consider. The more important and often overlooked factor is the
immigrant’s liberty interest to live and remain in the United States.
Procedural due process in administrative immigration hearings can be
compared to many other proceedings. Some say they should be
compared to criminal proceedings, other liken them more to property,
welfare, and employment hearings where less due process is
afforded.287 Regardless, the Supreme Court has held that when a
litigant will lose his physical liberty, it is paramount and significant
that procedural safeguards should be recognized.288 Under the
Mathews factors, an immigrant in a deportation hearing is losing his
right to be free which is a significant liberty interest. Additionally,
the risk of erroneous removal is high. Although the cost of the
government may increase if additional procedural protections are
offered, it is necessary to secure th private interest of the individual.
The interest to live as a free individual in the United States is
paramount. Thus, a slight increase in cost does not outweigh the risk
of erroneous deprivation of individual freedom. Congressional
reliance on discretionary decisions is unwise when such a meaningful
liberty interest is at stake. Therefore, there should be significant
procedural protections offered, inclusive of the right to seek
discretionary relief.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Due to discretion in immigration law, an immigrant who has
challenged the proceedings as procedurally or substantively unfair
would have a different fate depending on where they are detained and
tried. On one end, there is an extensive Congressional framework in
the form of statutes and highly rule-governed procedures that leave
immigration judges little ability from which to deviate.289 On the
other end, the immigration system cannot be wholly rule-driven.290
These deviations and injections of discretion can have unintended
287
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constitutional consequences that could lead to inconsistencies in the
application of Congressional law. These inconsistencies often
depend on where the deportation proceeding is held. The vastly
different approaches taken by the circuit courts require intervention
by the legislature to more clearly express the will of Congress. If
Congress is unwilling to create new laws to address the situation,
intervention by the United States Supreme Court is crucial. The
Supreme Court must establish a national rule of law to ensure
fundamental fairness to all persons in deportation hearings regardless
of where the hearing is held.
Although many other rights have been protected by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment, it is worth noting that discretionary
relief should also be considered in this realm of Constitutionally
protected rights for as without it, a deprivation of liberty and life
would occur. The Supreme Court has often been the guardian of
individual freedoms in our democracy and has stated “[a]s the
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its
principle in their own search for greater freedom.” 291 It is our
generation’s role to further these fundamental freedoms by adopting a
national standard set forth in Copeland. The Second Circuit standard
for fundamental fairness seeks to reinforce the principles set forth in
the Constitution that all persons born or naturalized in the United
States shall not be abridged the privileges of life, liberty, and
property without due process of law. 292
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